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'. However, American policies towards the decolonization of Indonesia during the years following the second world war did not emerge in a vacuum. Accordingly, in this essay I wish to explore the evolution of American diplomats' views regarding Dutch colonial rule in Southeast Asia between the early 1920s and 1942, the year the Japanese invaded the Dutch East Indies. Through an examination of the steady stream of reports which US diplomats in Batavia, Medan, and Soerabaya transmitted to the Department of State in Washington DC, one can gain insights into the official perceptions and popular stereotypes that shaped Americans' understanding of Dutch colonial rule. After all, the formulation of US foreign policy -as was true for die diplomatic relations of many other democratic nations -relied not only on 'perceptions of the official mind' but also heeded an array of more nebulous public opinions 2 . Even though the US consuls' dispatches about the social and political situation of the Dutch East Indies had only minimal impact on the actual implementation of US foreign policy in me Pacific, which was crafted primarily in the corridors of power in the White House and the State Department in Washington DC, their reports mirrored fluctuations in both official and popular attitudes. In general, diplomats in the field tried to respond to the issues that most preoccupied their superiors, while their correspondence also echoed changes in public sentiments regarding either Dutch colonialism or European imperialism in general.
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Hence, these diplomatic missives served as a kind of barometer of the shifting American interpretations of Dutch East Indies' governance between the 1920s, when they offered praise and admiration, and the 1930s, a decade in which US diplomats became quite critical of the colonial government's repressive policies towards native politicians and condemned its tendency to incarcerate individual Indonesians without a formal judicial hearing. Towards the end of the 1930s and in the early 1940s, when the Japanese threat in the Pacific loomed larger than life, American judgments about Dutch colonial rule altered once again, at this time incorporating both positive and negative evaluations in order to develop a realistic assessment of the Dutch East Indies as a credible American ally in a potential military clash with Japan, while ackowledging the legitimacy and strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement. A variety of both tangible and intangible factors molded Americans' visions of empire in the Dutch East Indies and their change over time. First, America's own particular colonial experience in the Philippines played a distinct role in determining US diplomats' attitudes towards the imperial policies of other Western nations, whether the Dutch in the Indonesian archipelago, the British in India, or the French in Indo China. Second, the immediate economic concerns with protecting American financial investments in the Indies informed their attitudes towards Dutch colonial rule. Third, the military and strategic interests of the United States in the Pacific affected American judgments about the validity of Dutch colonial mastery. The new social commitments of president Franklin Delano Roosevelt's 'New Deal' in the 1930s and the more liberal ideological tenor of his State Department constituted a fourth factor that colored American interpretations. The social agenda of the Roosevelt administration inaugurated a new political discourse about the protection of the economic position and civil rights of poor and disenfranchised American citizens. This novel political vocabulary emphasizing due process of law or the basic civil liberties and legal entitlements of individual citizens, regardless of their racial or economic background, also reverberated in American diplomatic discussions about colonial Indonesia in the 1930s. Thus the manner in which individual diplomats incorporated this new political idiom added a fifth component to the shifting American attitudes towards Dutch rule in the Indies.
These more or less concrete factors were further compounded by elusive, cultural forces. American observers stationed in Indonesia in the 1920s and 1930s also relied on their own unique sense of history when they attempted to disentangle the social and political realities of Dutch colonial rule. In this context we can more or less assume that the US consuls general who were posted in Batavia, or the American consuls assigned to Medan and Soerabaya, were not among the most senior officers the US diplomatic corps could muster. They tended to be mid-level diplomats, whose outlook on the world revealed some of the limitations inherent in the average educated American's comprehension of European or Southeast Asian history, geography, and international politics. In their reports to the State Department in Washington DC, members of the American consular corps stationed in the Dutch East Indies between 1920 and 1942 occasionally created a story about Dutch history that was shaped less by an astute
Visions of empire 239 analysis of Dutch East Indies politics but articulated, instead, a more inchoate sense of the history of the Dutch nation in the European métropole, which they perceived through a uniquely American prism. To many Americans, the image of Dutchness was a highly positive one, embodying 'good citizenship, stubborn courage, industry, resourcefulness, and cleanliness' 3 . In American folklore, Holland and its wealthy burghers were represented as staunch supporters of the United States' struggle for independence from Britain in 1776 and as friendly trading partners and fellow democrats ever since. As the historian Gerlof Homan has recently maintained, beginning with the se venteenm-century New Netherlands, Americans have esteemed the Dutch nation 'as a model of a stable and progressive democracy, inhabited by an industrious and peace-loving population' 4 .
In In American vernacular speech, though, the flipside of this imagery was expressed in phrases such as 'going Dutch', 'Dutch uncle', and 'Dutch courage', which associated the shrewd business practices of Dutchmen with avarice or even an intoxicated, and therefore dubious, integrity. Thus, between the early 1920s and the Japanese occupation of the Dutch East Indies in 1942, American observers in Southeast Asia incorporated in their diplomatic appraisals a mixture of concrete economic concerns, political agendas, and personal sensibilities as well as more ambiguous cultural clichés. The ways in which these distinct elements either overlapped or sequentially dominated American perspectives during the decades of the 1920s, the 1930s, and the early 1940s provide a historical background to American policies towards the Indonesian struggle for independence in the post-world war II era.
Americans' rosey-coloredperspectives in the 1920s
'The Philippines are a mere incident in the life of the United States', wrote Chas L. Hoover, the US consul general in Batavia, to the secretary of state in 1925, 'while the continued possession of the [Indonesian] islands is essential to the very life and prosperity of the Netherlands' 6 . Hoover hit the nail on the head. Although the role of colonial overlord of a region of islands in Southeast Asia was a new and unaccustomed one for the United States, most Americans familiar with their nation's colonial performance glorified their administrative track record in the Philippines. Since the US colonial expansion into the Philippines was primarily a project of the Republican party, supporters of a sequence of Republican presidents, beginning with president William McKinley in 1900, wholeheartedly embraced the stated goal of bringing 'happiness, peace, and prosperity' to Filipino natives. The US intervention in the Philippines, as was the case with American intrusions elsewhere in the world, was legitimized by appealing to an evangelical sense of mission or a 'manifest' historical destiny 7 . As Hoover noted, however, the possession of the Philippines was only tangential to the identity of the United States. Besides, as far as the nation's economic wellbeing was concerned, the Philippines represented more of a financial drain than an economic asset 8 . Soon after they were firmly ensconced in their new position as colonial masters, though, Americans went to work with their customary, indomitable optimism. Within a little more than a decade or so, the US boasted of a lengthy list of conspicuous accomplishments, proud of having constructed longer roads and dug better sewers than any colonial power in Asia. American expenditures on health care enabled the Filipino population to double in size between 1900 and 1920, and American education fostered a rise in literacy rates from 20 percent to 50 percent within one generation; by 1909 the US administration exulted in having established 4000 elementary schools for Filipinos
9 . Yet at no time did the Philippines represent either a real benefit or a genuine threat to the lifeblood of the American nation. Besides to love 'discipline and order' grounded in constitutional law but, above all, learn 'to yield to it instinctively'
11 . According to Raymond Kennedy, a professor of government and political science at Yale University in the late 1930s, American dominance in the Philippines constituted a 'deviation' from the universal patterns of colonial rule elsewhere in the world 12 . From the outset the American government tried to downplay its official role as an imperial power and avoided the addition of a separate colonial department to its bureaucratic structure. Instead, president McKinley created a Bureau of Insular Affairs for the political and administrative oversight of the Philippines that became part of the War Department. Because the American people had always felt a 'deep repugnance ' to both the conquest of distant lands and 'the assumption of rule over alien people', political scientist Rupert Emerson argued at the outset of world war II, the official policy visa-vis the Philippines was to nurture an independent Filipino state from the very beginning 13 . In general, as Edward Said has written in his recent Culture and imperialism, Americans tended to cloak their imperial ventures abroad in altruistic overtones, despite much evidence that their true goal was to garner financial profit; in American popular mythology, Said argues, US foreign incursions were presumably dedicated to the defense of freedom and democracy, to extend the rule of law and the American dream to less fortunate people elsewhere in the world 14 .
The situation of America's colonial neighbor in Southeast Asia was fundamentally different. In the Netherlands, wrote Richard Tobin, a diplomat assigned to the American embassy in The Hague on December 27,1927, the situation in the Indies is the subject of great anxiety among all classes. 'The prosperity of the Dutch nation is almost wholly dependent on the colonies. The loss of the colonial possessions might result in financial as well as political ruin.. .'
15 . Nonetheless, Richard Tobin demurred, the current nationalist agitation in British India and China have been viewed with a lack of true concern by a country that is convinced it has governed its colonial possessions 'with more wisdom than the British and with more vigor than the French'
16 .
This vigorous wisdom, according to an American consul in Batavia in the early 1920s, resided in a form of government that was 'paternal and therefore not in any sense democratic'. While these conditions had caused considerable dissatisfaction 
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Frances Gouda among the educated native and European residents, he admitted that on the whole ithad worked well and had served the best interests, political and commercial, of the colony, especially with regard to the needs and protection of the native population: 'perhaps in no other way could these needs be so fully and completely met than by such an autocratic power intelligently applied' 17 . One of the secrets of the Dutch success, wrote another American diplomat from Soerabaya in 1924, is that indigenous peoples are left free to adhere to their 'own customs or adat' as long as they are peaceful and 'do not interfere with European exploitation' 18 . A scion of a famous American family, Nicholas Roosevelt, concurred that the Dutch always tried to improve the welfare of the natives and never interfered with their traditions and superstitions; whereas the average American or Englishman, he wrote in 1925, had little patience with habits that were impractical but which were deeply rooted and important to the natives, 'the Dutch accept it and make the most of it'
19 .
Consul general Chas Hoover agreed with this appraisal: the present government of the Indies, he wrote in 1925, is the heritage of long years of patient effort on the part of the Dutch to rule the archipelago 'with a minimum of expenditure of blood and treasure'. He conceded, though, that this system of government entailed throughout the 300 years of Dutch colonization a 'toleration of features which were distasteful to the progressive, liberty-loving Dutch, but which had become fixed in the very lives of the apathetically conservative people of these islands' 20 . Hoover acknowledged that the Dutch fostered the participation of a growing number of natives in the affairs of local government, while carefully respecting adat in 'all matters not regulated by Dutch codes' 21 . He went on to report that experiments of this kind have not been brilliantly succesful in other countries where people are at a low stage of development, but in the Dutch East Indies, he said, the system of training for the responsibilities of self government may be more intelligently directed than where it is attempted to clothe a people with powers of whose proper use they have not the slightest conception 22 .
Hoover's successor, Coert du Bois, also gave the Dutch colonial administration a boisterous pat on the back and a ringing endorsement. In a lengthy report submitted to the State Department in 1929, he predictably pointed to the Dutch control of the archipelago's economic resources and their military might. But probably most important, he wrote, was 'that the whites -particularly the 30,000 Dutch who are doing it -are experts in the art of government'. By government, Du Bois specified, 
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he did not imply merely the collection of taxes and the punishment of offenses. Instead, he described the magnificent organization, construction, and operation of irrigation works to grow rice for the densest population in the world, the diligent provisions of public health and the prevention of epidemics, the maintenance of public order among potentially hostile peoples and tribes, the suppression of piracy, the slave trade, and the prevalent abuses of the native rulers. Dutch civil servants, said Du Bois, provided 'sympathetic and paternal' care to a people incapable of planning it and carrying it out for themselves: the present Dutch government in the Indies would seem to deserve the whole-hearted support of every Western government whose nationals have interests here 23 . Du Bois's praise knew few limits: he described the typical Dutch government official in the Indies as honest, courteous, sympathetic, broadminded and highly educated. He brought to his work an infinite capacity for obtaining all the facts before making a decision, 'but when he says no he means it and resents being urged to reconsider'. Du Bois commended Dutch civil servants, too, for their 'willingness... to meet, examine, and discuss with friendly interest the aspirations of the brown people to learn how to govern themselves' 24 . Raymond Kennedy, who became a senior policymaker in the newly created Southwest Pacific affairs division in the State Department towards the end of world war II -where he could rely on his extensive scholarly knowledge of Indonesia -reiterated this judgment in 1942. Kennedy said that Dutch civil servants in Indonesia were 'the best colonial administrators in the world' 25 . Secure in their military foothold in the Philippines -the Filipino bases of the US army and navy were paid for directly by taxpayers in the United States and did not strain the annual colonial budgets -Americans in the 1920s did not yet worry about the strategic importance of the Indonesian archipelago, if only because the incipient aggression of Japan, and its eventual thirst for oil, were still elusive. Thus, the operative words in their rosey-colored and congratulatory assessments of Dutch colonial policy during the 1920s were erudition, vitality, thoroughness, intelligence, and paternalism -a characterization that would have prompted many a Dutch civil servant, planter, or businessman to smile in agreement and to burst with pride 26 . Whether one was hyper ethically inspired and had genuine faith in eventual Indonesians' independence, or whether one held a more jaundiced view of Indonesians' capacity to rule themselves, this laudatory American evaluation would have validated the self image of a large segment of the Dutch community in the Indies and nurtured the conviction that 'they were accomplishing something great over there' 27 . Conversely, some critics of Dutch colonial rule-ranging from committed Dutch socialists to Indonesian nationalistsmight have dismissed these judgments as evidence of Americans' inherent political naivete or of their desire to stay in the Dutch colonial government's good graces in order to safeguard the profitability of US oil and rubber ventures in the Dutch East Indies 28 .
Trade between America and the Indies reached a record high in the 1920s; US imports from the Indies in 1920 amounted to 167 million dollars, while American exports to the Indies totaled 59 million dollars. These figures continued to grow throughout the decade, and during its last five years American products constituted on the average 9.7 percent of total imports annually; the US share of the Indonesian export trade averaged 13.5 percent 29 . . Some modern analysts, however, have disagreed. The historian Gerlof Homan, for example, has argued straightforwardly that 'American attitudes were strongly influenced by United States' economic interests in Indonesia 37 . The reality most likely resided somewhere in the middle. During the decade of the 1920s, the predominant American diplomatic assessment of Dutch East Indies ' society combined a keen concern with sheltering American economic interests with a series of residual stereotypes orunexamined truisms about Dutch history. Such phrases as the 'progressive, liberty-loving Dutch ', or ' the Dutch may be considered democratic from a European point of view' reflected American consular officers' admiration for the Dutch colonial state's shrewd management of the Indonesian economy in the 1920s and the huge financial revenues it generated for both Dutch and foreign investors 38 . American diplomats articulated their intuitive admiration for Dutch resourcefulness and commercial ingenuity, a vision of Dutchness that seemed to simulate the American embrace of big business and capitalist ideology during the 'Roaring Twenties', a decade dominated by the conservative Republican presidencies of Warren Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert Hoover. As the businessmen's newspaper par excellence, the Wall Street Journal, reported in November, 1925, the Dutch East Indies were a 'marvelously wealthy colonial empire, excellently governed, with many of the modern facilities for comfortable living'. The islands, the article stated, are rich in raw materials and offer 'attractive opportunities for large-scale production' 39 .
Besides, given their own efforts in the 1920s at helping to install a 'stable government' in the Philippines-the precondition for Filipino independence as promised and agreed upon in 1916-and to develop a viable economy, Americans were astonished, for instance, by the fact that the average annual amount of rice produced per hectare was 2200 kilos in Java and 3000 kilos in Bali, while the figure was only 1200 kilos per hectare in the Philippines 40 .
At the same time, American diplomats in the 1920s also absorbed prevalent Eurocentric perceptions of colonized, indigenous peoples. They scrutinized Indonesian society and culture through the same colonial looking glass as any Westerner and the 'gaze of empire' affected their powers of observation, too. Americans regularly concocted images of childlike colonial subjects, such as the Javanese or Filipinos, that revealed their Western biases 41 . In October, 1928, consul general Coert du Bois, for example, came up with the simple-minded binary generalization that the Javanese were either 'aristocratic dreamers' or 'land-grabbing peasants'. He registered his admiration for the average Javanese aristocrat, whom he described as a 'gracious, polished, and intelligent' gentleman. Du Bois depicted the average Javanese peasant, however, as a 'superstitious, docile, and half-hearted Moslim' 42 . In 1931, the American consul stationed in Medan, Daniel Braddock, painted a picture of Javanese coolies employed as contract laborers on rubber or tobacco plantations, as a child, carefree, improvident of the future. As long as he is well treated ... he has little desire to leave the estate and seek work elsewhere. As with a child, he is apprehensive of the unknown 43 .
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In their own colony, meanwhile, Americans insisted that primitive Filipinos had to do an 'apprenticeship of obedience' before they would be capable of ruling themselves, but they complimented themselves on the lack of communist ideology among native nationalists 46 . But their patronizing opinions about the lethargy or backwardness of colonized peoples, whether Indonesians or Filipinos, prompted Americans to focus on the clever Dutch management of the lucrative Indies economy, wondering, perhaps, whether it could provide a model for Americans to follow. The American governor general of the Philippines in 1931, Dwight F. Davis, for instance, attributed the high annual yields of the rice harvests in Java and Bali to the Dutch confidence in 'scientific development' and the 'centers of agricultural research' maintained by the government in conjunction with the private sector, which 'are of particular interest to the Philippines' because Java was ahead of the Philippines by '30 or 40 years' 47 .
However, the Great Depression of the 1930s reduced the Indies' financial revenues to a shadow of their former corpulent selves. The Depression, meanwhile, was engendered in part by the United States, where the Republican party's unrestrained celebration of the free forces of capitalism had ended abruptly in October, 1929, when Wall Street crashed and American financial markets crumbled like a house of cards. When American economic access to the world's resources was threatened, or when Japan became a more palpable military danger in the Pacific, while the US government continued to formulate provisions for the eventual independence of the neighboring Philippines, Dutch colonial rule began to pale in comparison to America's supposedly 'benevolent' colonial enterprise in the Philippines 48 . Moreover, the chronological proximity of the ascendancy of Bonifacius Cornelis de Jonge to the position of governor general in 1931 and the Republican party's loss of the American presidency, after controlling it for twelve years, had an indelible impact, too. De Jonge's repressive reign, which did not exhibit much respect for the civil liberties or free speech of either Indonesian nationalists or Dutch critics of the Indies government, flew in the face of the emerging socio-economic concerns of the Roosevelt administration. A final factor that shaped the different, and more discerning, judgments of US diplomats assigned to colonial Indonesia in the 1930s was the delayed effect of the Rogers Act of 1924, which had amalgamated the formerly separate diplomatic and consular services and radically restructured them into the foreign service of the United States. The Rogers Act had aimed to attract experienced, highly skilled and welltrained personnel into the diplomatic service, men who would exhibit the intellectual range and ability to conduct diplomacy in an expert manner. Introduced to the US Congress by representative John Jacob Rogers from Massachusetts, the act had opened the foreign service to all qualified applicants rather than restrict it to the privileged few whose wealth, political contacts, and social snobbery had dominated the American diplomatic establishment until then. The Rogers Act laid the foundation for the 'professionalization, democratization, and specialization' of the US foreign service, but it would not be until the 1930s that these goals began to be realized 49 . Walter Foote, for example, was allowed to complete both a master's degree and doctorate in international relations at the American University in Washinston DC during the mid1930s before he returned to Batavia as consul general. Although he wrote a dissertation about the US neutrality board during world war I rather than Southeast Asian politics, the mere fact that he managed to earn a doctorate registered the State Department's desire for foreign service officers with a greater intellectual sophistication.
Americans' more critical 'visions of empire' in the Dutch East Indies during the 1930s
US diplomats in the 1920s had not failed to notice the growth of the Indonesian nationalist movement. They routinely sent long lists of all the native political organizations to their superiors in the State Department. But, as consul general Coert du Bois had argued in 1929, the measures of the government -quietly backed up by an efficient and highly centralized police, army, and navy -are 'disarming to the native agitators and the likelihood of anything resembling a general, open, armed, and organized rebellion against Dutch rule is remote' 50 . Two years earlier Nicholas Roosevelt, too, had dismissed anti-Dutch agitation as the evil doings of a tiny clique of self-interested, upper-class natives who wished to expand their power base 51 . American observers-ironically so, because within the United States itself they were no strangers to an exaggerated fear of communism -offered wry commentary on the 'curse' that rested on certain members of the Dutch community, whose 'shortsightedness' seemed to confuse Indonesian nationalism with evidence of communist propaganda 52 . They did not object to governor general Dirk Fock's 'high-handed authoritarianism', as Takashi Shiraishi has labelled his reign, in the face of popular nationalist agitation during the first half of the 1920s 53 . About the carefully plotted communist uprisings in Western Java and West Sumatra in 1926 and early 1927, the US consul general had written to his superiors in the State Department that he was convinced that anyone who participated in these actions barely knew such a place as Russia existed and knew nothing about the communism: the average Indonesian 'loves theatricals, is easily led, and has the mild hatred of the dark man for the white man and his oppressive civilization 54 . Hoover argued paradoxically that it might be convenient for some Dutch officials to raise the 'specter of communism in order to divert the attention from their own incapacity as administrators 55 . But in the early 1930s, doubts about the legitimacy of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia, and a general critique of thé inherent injustice of all European imperial regimes in Asia, began to inform the official discourse of the State Department. Once the Roosevelt administration inaugurated its 'New Deal' and a legalistic concern with the 'underdog' and social justice became part of the political grammar of US domestic and foreign policy, the official stance towards the plight of colonized Whatever fortitude his Dutch ancestry may have bestowed upon him, Roosevelt needed all the strength of character-as well as political savvy-he could muster to restructure American society in the face of a devastating economic depression. Elsewhere in the world the Great Depression of the 1930s had given rise to myriad monopolistic trade practices in colonial economies -higher tariffs, production quotas, preferential trade agreements and so on -in order to protect the interests of the mother country; such protective policies, in turn, caused anxiety in the United States about its dearly beloved principles of free trade. The Smoot-Hawley Act, however, had erected around the United States one of the highest tariff walls in the world, and the concern about free trade focused unilaterally -and hypocriticallyon America's unfettered access to the world's markets 63 . Inevitably, the world-wide economic depression of the early 1930s profoundly affected the Indonesian export-driven economy and also jeopardized the viability of US financial interests. Between 1929 and 1933 the total value of Indonesian exports dropped precipitously from 1488 million guilders to 525 million guilders. The market value of the Javanese sugar production alone declined from 350 million guilders during 1928-1929 to a paltry 19.5 million in 1934-1935. While rubber prices had deteriorated more gradually, the market price for tin, tea, and quinine dropped quickly and ominously in a few years 64 . When the demand for cash crops fell and world prices plummeted, the 'phantom' prosperity of the Indies ended turmoil and international economic tensions -in May of 1931, when he was named the new governor general. US consul general Kenneth Patton informed the secretary of state that in the Indies the news was received with total surprise, and that De Jonge was viewed as a 'dark horse' because he had no real background in colonial affairs, given his past experience as minister of war during world war I and as managing director of the Royal Dutch Shell since then. The Dutch commercial element, he commented, was 'frankly delighted' since they expected the new governor general to represent their 'interests against those of the native population' 69 . The socialist press, in contrast, was full of gloom and doom, owing to its conviction that De Jonge's appointment signalled the triumph of reactionary forces and 'oil capital'. Patton, for his part, concurred: he informed the secretary of state that he expected De Jonge to initiate an administration 'favorable to big business' that would be less 'sympathetically inclined to native political aspirations' 70 .
The government in Holland had given De Jonge detailed guidelines. He was instructed to balance the budget, to restructure the economy, to promote political decentralization, and, above all, to assure social peace and order by suppressing all revolutionary commotion 71 . The new governor general, meanwhile, expressed firm opinions about the task at hand. Rather than maintain its dignity, the hyper-ethical government of the Indies had 'flirted with the unreliable big mouths of the nationalist movement' and had embraced the eventual independence of Indonesia not only as acceptable but as simply a matter of time; the danger, De Jonge argued, resided not in the nationalist movement but in the defeatist and weak-kneed mentality of Europeans 72 . Instead, the government should guide the nationalist movement 'into fixed channels' and forcefully oppose all attempts at revolution, however petty or insignificant they might seem 73 . The installation of B. C. de Jonge as governor general provoked a new awareness among American diplomats that the stoic self-confidence of the Indies government was rattled due, in large part, to the chorus of nationalist voices demanding to be heard. The irony was that De Jonge's arbitrary suppression of native politicians made Americans more sensitive to the aspirations of the nationalist movement. After 1931, the tone of American diplomats' missives to Washington began to strike a more disapproving note. De Jonge, they commented, not so much bludgeoned as condescendingly mocked his critics on the political left and he imperiously silenced Indonesians who demanded a political voice. Patton reported that the new governor general exhibited a lack of 'good temper', which did not 'enhance his prestige' 74 .
In the 1930s a sequence of American consular officials assigned to Batavia began to employ a typically American legalistic idiom to register their misgivings about the government's censorship of the press, restriction of the freedom of speech and assembly, and its unforgivable policy of placing nationalist politicians under preventative arrest. Patton, for instance, commenting upon the arrest of Soekarno on August 21,1933, reported that De Jonge 's decision to employ his authority to intern Soekarno as an undesirable is 'essentially a political action resting entirely on the discretion of the executive'. He noted further that this measure was a radical departure from the policies pursued by governor general De Graeff, who had judged it 'not politic to use his arbitrary authority to intern native political leaders, and that it was preferable to prosecute them for actual violations of the criminal code' 75 . A year later, Sidney Browne, an officer in consulate-general in Batavia, mentioned regarding the arrests of Ardjono, president of the central committee of the PNI, Moerad, the party's secretarytreasurer, and Soekra, one of its commissioners, that they would be interned but not prosecuted since 'prosecution might cause disturbances and it was considered more important to maintain public law and order than to determine whether or not the troublemakers were legally punishable' 76 .
Walter Foote wrote that De Jonge's reign had forced native politicians to regroup, since any Indonesian politician, whether suspected of communist sympathies or not, was now 'at risk of being summarily banished' as a preemptive measure to, among others, the malaria-infested internment camp of Boven Digul in New Guinea created in the late 1920s 77 . The Chicago Daily News's foreign correspondent, A. T. Steele, used more straight-forward language in his description of the 'policy of prevention'. A Dutch official had reputedly told him that the motto of the colonial government was don't educate the people and they won't want things they don't need and shouldn't have; prevent the spread of subversive propaganda and you won't have unrest; exile or imprison the worst of the radicals and you needn't fear serious revolt 78 .
In their earnest attempts to disentangle the intricate web of the many political parties of the Indies, both native and European, US foreign service officers in the 1930s chronicled the nationalist movement with greater urgency and frequency, and they questioned the identification of nationalism with communism. In order to walk the intellectual tightrope between the residual anti-colonialism of the Roosevelt administration and an Indonesian independence movement that might celebrate 'Asia for Asians' under Japanese tutelage and would welcome Japanese expansionism, they either downplayed or openly scorned the Dutch proclivity to conflate nationalism with communism. Instead, they blamed De Jonge's antagonism towards the best interests of the Indonesian people for bringing about a 'crystallization' of native nationalist parties 79 . 'Pure communistic doctrines', asserted consul general Erie Dickover in 1938, had never gained many adherents in the Netherlands Indies since such ideologies are 'beyond the comprehension' of a people who know little or nothing of the modern industrial, financial, and political world 80 . Walter Foote announced that the apprehension about the spread of communism among the Indonesian Chinese population had also captured the imagination of the colonial state 81 . Important Dutchmen, he reported, blamed the Filipino independence movement for much of Indonesia's political unrest 82 . Later in the 1930s Albert E. Clattenburg in Batavia wrote that a native employee of the US consulate had been practicing his English lessons, which included a definition 'brute = white man. Clattenburg declared, however, that this did not mean that the native was a communist, but merely that the white man was 'losing his traditional semi-deified status here just as he lost it in the Philippines years ago' 83 . A journalist for The Washington Star reported as late as the Spring of 1941 that the Dutch believed that Filipinos had been 'spoiled' by too much education and too much prosperity -that they 'would be a happier and less restless people had they been given fewer of the 'benefits' of civilization' 84 .
On the whole, American observers rejected the idea of a pervasive communist plot and they no longer celebrated the thoroughness, wisdom, and intelligence, as their predecessors in the 1920s had done, of the Dutch East Indies government's policies. Instead, US diplomatic officials criticized the Dutch political strategy of trying to divide the archipelago into more autonomous political regions in order to guarantee the continuation of Dutch rule in the Indies. This plan's calculating logic was not lost on American observers, who noted that the recognition of regional autonomy would separate 'the sheep from the goats' and might dissipate the desire for Indonesian independence on a national scale and would thus 'ensure Dutch sovereignty of the islands as a whole' 85 .
As the Roosevelt administration nurtured its official support for an autonomous democracy in the Philippines, American judgments about the Dutch East Indies in particular, and European imperialism in general, became more negative. But the confluence of the world-wide economic Depression, the substantial US holdings in Indonesian oil and rubber production, and the growing menace of Japanese imperia-lism prevented the American foreign policy establishment from morally condemning the Dutch colonial regime outright. After all, they would need Dutch military cooperation in case of a war with Japan. It is also possible that Roosevelt's personal pride in his Dutch ancestry, and his emerging friendship with queen Wilhelmina, may have made cunning foreign services officers, anxious to protect their professional careers in the US diplomatic service, a bit more cautious in their moral censure of Dutch colonial rule, while daring to be more critical of the French in Indo China or the British in India. Thus, in articulating their disapproval of the repressive policies of governor general De Jonge, US diplomats employed a formalistic lawyerly vocabulary that expressed their dismay with Dutch violations of due process of law and the arbitrary infringement of Indonesians' civil rights. They argued that the governor general's hostility to the native population had subverted the advisory character of the Volksraad and converted it into nothing but 'an organ of opposition'. De Jonge's rampant abuse of his discretionary powers and the government's practice to banish individual Indonesians without formal adjudication was condemned as an infraction of the kinds of standard legal procedures that were a hallmark of all civilized societies. US diplomats judged the state's decision to require a declaration of loyalty from its civil servants to be 'provocative without strengthening the hands of the government' since anyone who was 'politically minded would sign falsely such declarations'. American diplomats denounced the governor general's 'police-state' methods and mentioned in 1935 that the government was now referred to by some Dutch people residing in the Indies as ' the fascist government'. They further criticized measures restricting the right of public assembly and legislation on censorship as responsible for 'driving the native political movement underground and into secrecy', and they predicted that sooner or later the government will find itself facing a 'powerful movement which can not be controlled by mere ordinances' 86 .
However, when the appointment of De Jonge's successor was disclosed, Walter Foote informed the State Department in July, 1936 , that the new governor general's reputation was a 'very liberal' and 'scrupulously honest' one. Thus Americans could anticipate a more broad-minded and humane policy towards the natives in economic as well as in political matters, although one of Foote's informants had allegedly told him that 'too much honesty is bad' for the Dutch East Indies and 'political liberalism and humanitarianism is fatal' 87 . After 1936 US foreign service officers in Batavia subjected Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer to less personal criticism than they had heaped upon his predecessor -and mentioned on various occasions that the new governor general's wife was American-but they continued to raise moral objections to the Indies government's encroachment upon the freedom of the Indies press or the civil liberties of Indonesians.
'hysterical', while the Dutch community in Indonesia repudiated the mother country as 'cowardly and imbued with defeatism' 92 . The US should pay attention to these matters, a US journalist in Manila proclaimed in 1940, because the East Indies had a far greater economic importance to the US than the Philippines. Moreover, the Indies geographic location and size gave them a more 'strategically commanding position' in the Western Pacific, even if they belonged to 'the politically insignificant Netherlands' 93 !
At the same time, the US foreign service officers also acknowledged the political sensibilities of Indonesians, and the ways in which the 'underprivileged classes' of the Indies resented the prerogatives possessed by 'European overlords'; they applauded Indonesians' yearning for a system under which they might be able to obtain 'equal rights' with Europeans 94 . With more than a hint of self-satisfaction, some Americans were convinced that in the eyes of a small but growing number of educated Indonesians, the Philippines were the most 'inspiring political example' in the world, even though Dutch officials viewed don Manuel L. Quezon as a more 'subversive character than Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin rolled into one'. If the Indonesian nationalists could not obtain what they had long struggled for under the Dutch flag, intoned various American pundits, then the 'desired alternative is progress and security along with the Philippines under the flag of the US' 95 .
Conclusion
As an unapologetic capitalist nation, American foreign policy was intent on protecting US financial investments in the Indonesian economy and equally determined to maintain American access to oil and rubber resources. While their praise of Dutch economic and administrative accomplishments in Indonesia in the 1920s had appealed to quintessentially American clichés about the free-trading and liberty-loving Dutch, US diplomats' criticism in the 1930s also expounded on uniquely American preoccupations. Despite their privileged position as 'outsiders', they translated the complex society of colonial Indonesia into their own vernacular and approached it through an American looking glass. Based on the prototype of America's colonial enterprize in the Philippines-heralded as a 'model of enlightenment' -many faulted the Dutch East Indies government for not being more like them 96 . American observers elevated their own 'exemplary' policy of stipulating a specific date for the unequivocal independence of the Philippines as a blueprint for other imperial nations to emulate. Besides, their conceit about the healthcare and Western schooling they had provided for Filipinos and, in contrast, the relatively aenemic educational infrastructure in Java, prompted Americans to repudiate colonial rule in Indonesia as a 'Dutch Treat' 97 .
Despite the more realistic and benign assessment of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia that had emerged in the early 1940s, the post-war era placed Americans decisively in the anti-imperialist camp, aided and abetted by the Indonesian nationalists' direct appeal to, or 'shrewd manipulation' of, international opinion 98 . In light of the escalating Cold War antagonism with the Soviet Union, the United States may also have been eager to curry the partisan favors of a newly independent Indonesia. But the heavy-handed role of the American foreign policy establishment in the Indonesian war of independence in 1945-1949 was not a purely capricious one and did not derive merely from a 'lack of trust or understanding' as Van der Meulen lamented in 1949. Instead, America's support of Indonesian independence mirrored the State Department's constantly shifting evaluation of America's geo-political interests; itreflected, too, the lingering commitment of the Democratic Party during Harry Truman's presidency -who followed, after all, in the footsteps of Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt -to the right of self determination. 
JOH. DE VRIES
Van dit werk dat de auteur tot proefschrift diende aan de Rijksuniversiteit Leiden, was de mare in dagbladrecensie (J. de Jong, De Volkskrant van 6 februari 1993) en tijdschriftbespreking (F. Broeze in NEHA-bulletin, i, 1993) vooruitgesneld. Mijn interesse was in de eerste plaats van zakelijke aard met betrekking tot de bedrijfsgeschiedenis van Nederland overzee maar bezat daarnaast ook een persoonlijk element. De bedrijfshistoricus A. Heerding, auteur van twee delen geschiedschrijving van Philips, vertelde destijds in geuren en kleuren hoe hij in de nadagen van de Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (hier verder aangeduid als KPM) archiefbestanddelen van de onderneming voor vernietiging had behoed en deze bij zich thuis had ondergebracht. Hij was bij de KPM zijn loopbaan begonnen en had zich voorgenomen na Philips de geschiedenis van de KPM te schrijven. Daarvan is het door zijn vroege dood niet gekomen maar de herinnering eraan bracht mij ertoe vooraf de lijst van archivalia in het boek van À Campo te raadplegen. Dit leverde een voor een proefschrift ongewone confrontatie op want een lijst van archivalia ontbreekt in dit werk. Wel bevat het een literatuurlijst (724-751) en natuurlijk geeft À Campo verwijzingen naar het KPM-archief, maar geen afzonderlijke lijst van archivalia die met name van belang kan zijn voor een inzicht in de structuur van een bewaard gebleven archief. Aldus blijf ik met een eerste punt, meer van informatie dan van discussie, zitten: waarom ontbreekt een lijst van archivalia die tot dusver zo typisch voor historische proefschriften was?
Dit was wat als een toevallige persoonlijke opmaat in de eerste plaats trof. Uiteraard moet de inhoud van dit volumineuze boek in de beschouwing vooropstaan. Reeds in de tweede zin van zijn tekst kondigt À Campo aan dat hij de uitgangspunten van zijn onderzoek in de inleiding weergeeft en het is met interesse dat de lezer zich voor de probleemstelling daarnaar wendt, mede omdat hierin toch in de eerste plaats ratio en legitimatie voor de grote uitvoerigheid van de auteur liggen. À Campo is ten aanzien van de probleemstelling glashelder: wat was de rol van de KPM in het Nederlandse imperialisme in de Indonesische archipel in de periode tot aan de eerste wereldoorlog? Dit lijkt op het eerste oog voldoende maar À Campo neemt hier een voorschot op de navolgende uitvoerigheid door de probleemstelling te nuanceren. Bij dit Nederlandse imperialisme is staatsvorming of nog beter: hervorming van de koloniale staat in het geding, bij de onderneming een sociaal-technologisch (of sociotechnisch) systeem en bij de rol van de KPM in het Nederlandse imperialisme blijkt het om het in elkaar grijpen van twee tegelijkertijd optredende processen te gaan: de ontwikkeling en hervorming van de koloniale staat en de groei van de pakketvaart als sociaal-technologisch systeem. Uitvoerig analyseert de schrijver hier zijn thematiek. Dat is te waarderen vanuit een noodzaak tot tekening en afbakening van de probleemstelling en het aangeven van achtergronden, zolang de zucht tot uitleg niet ontspoort. Dit is helaas het geval wanneer geconstateerd wordt dat de vraag naar de rol van de pakketvaart in de koloniale staatsvorming van Indonesië uitnodigt tot een beschrijving van het bedrijf als actor. Dat was al duidelijk maar is nog relevant. Wanneer evenwel daarop volgt dat in de navolgende hoofdstukken '... de geest en het gedrag van de onderneming, dus het bedrijf als actor worden beschreven' (36), is de theoretische diepgang overgegaan in schijndiepzinnig-
